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THE RISE OF AFRICAN INDEBTEDNESS IN NATAL 
DURING THE LATE COLONIAL PERIOD 
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In early 1990, the South African government embarked on a process of political change to 
stifle growing internal unrest and undermine the external sanctions campaign. But, despite 
removing political measures underpinning apartheid, it has done little about basic socio- 
economic problems. The most daunting of these problems is that of poverty, which, in South 
Africa possibly more than in any other country, reflects the institutionalized inequalities 
within society. African poverty, in particular, is widespread; the Second Carnegie Inquiry 
into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa reported that in 1980 60.5 per cent of 
Africans were living in poverty. [l] This poverty is not only the manifestation of the great 
inequalities within society but, to a great extent, results from generations of deliberate 
official policies. 
Impoverishment has gone hand in hand with growing indebtedness. While indebtedness is 
obviously a symptom of impoverishment, it also contributes to it. In his study of the African 
poor, John Iliffe distinguishes between the poor, struggling continuously to preserve 
themselves from physical want, and the very poor who have permanently or temporarily 
failed in that struggle. [2] By 1910 many Africans in Natal fell into the former category. 
This paper examines the way in which the insidious growth of indebtedness, as a result of 
spreading poverty, was drawing many Africans into a situation where, during the twentieth 
century, they fell into the category of the very poor. To do this, four forms of indebtedness 
are examined: to money-lenders, farmers, traders and lawyers. The paper ends with an 
assessment of the Natal government's response to the growing crisis. 
Iliffe draws a distinction between the poverty of those with relatively ample resources, 
especially land, and those who were losing access to such resources and were unable to earn 
sufficient to meet their minimum needs. [3] In the former situation in Natal, kinship 
provided the poor with the mechanisms they needed to survive. These included the 
ukutekela custom. To tekela, literally to beg, enabled members of a homestead whose crops 
had failed to obtain food from other homesteads. Failure to provide food in such a case was 
regarded as a serious offence. [4] In addition, the practice of sisa'ing existed for those 
without cattle: a patron who sisa'd stock was entitled to any increase while the recipient 
could stave off poverty by using the sisa'd cattle for rni$ and ploughing. 
Although the colonial presence contributed to changes within African society, the state at 
first did not have the resources to enforce changes, while the primitive nature of settler 
agriculture ensured the expansion of the homestead economy to supply produce for the 
market. [5] Although it was impossible in most reserves for Africans to cultivate more than a 
small proportion of their land, a majority lived on white-owned farms. Until the late 1870s, 
the labour and rental demands of the settlers did not seriously affect the homestead economy. 
At the same time, with few fences, and with so much land owned by speculators or the 
Crown, Africans in even the most inhospitable parts of Natal could graze their cattle and 
l make gardens elsewhere. These conditions did, however, mean there was little need for most 
Africans to adapt their methods of agriculture to cope with the demands of the colonial 
market. 
The market economy did, however, lead to restratification within African society. 
Homesteads near markets were well placed to accumulate wealth, while homestead heads 
with a special relationship with their chiefs were better able to profit than were less 
favoured men. Therefore, even in geographically advantageous areas, not all Africans could 
respond equally. For some the market economy could have meant impoverishment. 
In the 1880s, the expansion of settler agriculture began placing restrictions on African access 
to land and resources, both on farms and in the reserves. With less land at their disposal, the 
quality of herds and of harvested crops declined. Compytition for resources, particularly in 
the reserves, became widespread with an increasing number of Africans becoming 
impoverished as they fell behind in the competition. 
The slide into poverty also owed much to the series of ecological disasters which hit Natal 
from the late 1880s. Droughts, locusts, rinderpest and East Coast fever played havoc with 
the homestead economy. The impact of rinderpest was particularly devastating and 
rebuilding herds was painfully slow. Under these circumstances the stratification between 
rich and poor became even more marked with the latter having few resources to rebuild their 
herds or to cultivate sufficient grain. The widespread destruction of herds meant that the sisa 
system, which had ensured the survival of those with few resources, virtually ceased to 
function and Africans turned to men such as traders for cattle, thus further undermining the 
socio-economic relationships underpining African society. The disasters also saw a growing 
number of Africans dependent on purchases of grain to feed themselves. With limited 
financial resources, they either offered labour to farmers in return for maize or turned to 
traders for credit. 
The impact of these disasters was magnified both by the confiscation of cattle after the 
Bambatha rebellion and by demands for higher rentals (up to £10 a hut) and increased labour. 
Inadequate grain harvests and the destruction of herds undermined the tenants' ability to pay 
the increased rentals and the number being sued for non-payment grew. In cases where 
judgement was given against the tenant and he was unable to pay, cattle were usually 
attached, often of a value far in excess of the amount owed. Debtors who had insufficient 
stock were imprisoned, often more than once for the sanie debt. [6] On lands where farmers' 
labour requirements were growing, tenants had their grazing and gardens restricted [7], while 
the conditions under which they had to provide labour from their homesteads for six months 
each year were tightened, leaving them little opportunity to cultivate their gardens. [8] 
Bill Freund points out that "production in Africa cannot be divorced from questions of power 
and inequality". [9] That this is true for late-colonial Natal is evident from the changing 
balance of power within the settler community. Until the 1880s, the colonial administration 
had followed a broad policy of support for the homestead economy and had tended to resist 
farming pressure for legislation which would have undermined it. By the late 1880s, and 
particularly after 1893 when Natal received responsible government, this attitude changed 
and policies were adopted which were detrimental to African independence and which 
reflected notions of white supremacy. A dominant settler consciousness which stressed 
ethnic differences between white and black was beginning to develop. The result was the 
elaboration of a theory of black ethnic inferiority which was believed both to explain 
growing African impoverishment and to give legitimacy to the placing of legal restrictions on 
Africans. 
These restrictions were aimed primarily at destroying the homestead economy's 
competitiveness with white production. Legislation was introduced to protect the farmers' 
interests and to meet their demands for land and labour. The most important was the Native 
Servants' Identification Act of 1901 (and its 1903 amendment) which established a system of 
registration and of passes for labourers in Natal. [l01 A farmer had to endorse his tenant's 
pass with the period he was allowed to leave the farm, placing the latter in the absolute power 
of the farmer who could refuse to endorse the pass. [l l] 
A proliferation of laws affecting Africans led to anger and despair, feelings well summed up 
by Mbovu: "Government is expanding every few years. The Government resembles Tshaka, 
for he never got tired. Its army is money.'' [l21 And, indeed, these years saw a great 
increase in the amount Africans had to contribute to the colonial revenue, culminating in 
1905 in the levying of a poll tax of £1 on all unmarried male adults in the colony. [l31 In the 
same year a correspondent lamented in Ilanga that the "strings of one's money bag will 
remain loose now and be ever ready to shake out all that is in it for taxation". [l41 
The cumulative effects of taxation, legislation and disasters were making it difficult for most 
homesteads to support their members without the young men going out to work. In addition 
to farm work and labour in the towns, there was a growing demand for labour from 
industries, and particularly from the Transvaal gold mines. Although the colonial authorities 
were determined that the needs of the mines should not interfere with the colony's own 
labour requirements, migrant labour to the Witwatersrand was becoming an important source 
of homestead revenue. Yet migrant labour contributed to a spiralling situation. In the 
knowledge that money from labour would be available to buy grain, many homesteads raised 
the money needed for rentals and taxes (usually due between April and June, after the 
harvesting), by selling most of their maize crop at a time when prices were low. [l51 When, 
towards the end of the season they had to buy grain to feed themselves, prices were high [l61 
and they had to borrow from farmers, traders or money-lenders. 
Usurious Interest 
The problem of indebtedness was compounded by the difficulties Africans experienced 
obtaining either credit or loans at the prevailing colonial rates. Few Africans other than 
owners of land were able to offer collateral, and this excluded all but a small minority. 
Although the prevailing rate was 6 per cent, there was no legal limit placed on interest and 
African borrowers were required to pay high, usually usurious rates. There was a growing 
disquiet at the blatant injustices involved in the system, and in 1905 the Smythe ministry 
asked magistrates for information. [l71 
The information revealed both a widespread system of usury and an appalling lack of official 
concern. Although promissory notes had to be signed in front of a magistrate, few enquired 
about the interest charged. According to the magistrate pf Umvoti: "I witness hundreds each 
year - they disclose neither ... how much interest or how much money lent." He was 
prepared to accept this despite being aware of the very high rates charged. [l81 
Conditions in Stanger, a centre of Indian money-lending, were particularly notorious. [l91 In 
their work on Indian traders, Padayachee and Morrell refer to the lack of information on 
money-lenders because the informal nature of much of their business precluded the keeping 
of records. [20] The magistrate of Mapumulo referred, however, to a case which had 
attracted sufficient notoriety to come to his attention: Uhayi kaGudu, Mboza kaGudu and 
Macala kaMalamula had borrowed £7.10.0. from Amod M Mather of Stanger and were 
required to repay £20 after one month. This represents interest per annurn of 320 per cent. 
Being unable to do so they borrowed the money from a second Stanger money-lender, 
A E Jackson, and were required to pay a further £8 interest. [21] This was an extreme case, 
and in general 60 per cent per annum seems to have been the average interest charged to 
African borrowers. [22] Cases of money being advanced at between 600 and 800 per cent 
were common, however, with the borrower often having to surrender crops and stock to pay 
the interest [23] 
Indebtedness to Farmers 
Indebtedness amongst farm tenants appears to have been particularly widespread, in part 
reflecting the problems faced by their landlords. The first decade of the twentieth century 
was a difficult time for most white agriculturalists in Natal. Recession, drought and cattle 
disease militated against improvements and the credit which had been available in the 1890s 
was drying up. As a result, the prosperity enjoyed by successful dairy and beef farmers and 
by wattle and sugar planters did not filter through to those less enterprising men who made 
up the bulk of the settler farming community. For many farmers, and this also includes 
Kholwa such as Stephen Mini, the most remunerative form of farming remained squeezing as 
much labour and rental out of their tenants as they could. [24] 
Coping with difficulty themselves, few were concerned at the lot of their tenants. In 1908, 
the South African Native Races Committee pointed out that labour tenants were generally 
underpaid and miserably housed and fed. [25] As they were often unable to work off the 
farm to meet their financial needs, they were obliged to borrow from their landlords and to 
agree to pay back in labour, tying them into a cycle of indebtedness. As Robinson, a member 
of the Legislative Assembly, commented, "I think that in a great many cases these Natives 
for a long number of years remain practically slaves to their employers, and at the finish of 
their employment they have practically nothing". [26] This situation was exacerbated by the 
fact that many farmers demanded that the loan be repaid by a period of service in excess of 
the amount borrowed. [27] 
It is difficult to know how usurious this system was for few farmers kept records of such 
loans, and even fewer drew up promissory notes. According to Maurice Evans, a member of 
the Legislative Assembly, the usual rate closely followed that of the average interest charged 
to Africans by money-lenders, that is, Is. per E l  per month, or 60 per cent. [28] But in cases 
where promissory notes were issued, it was not necessarily to the advantage of the tenant. If 
he was unable to pay by the due date and was taken to court, a new loan would have to cover, 
necessitating another promissory note. [29] In 1907 Malkoba was taken to court by his 
landlord, Henry Callaway Gold of Ixopo division, over an unpaid loan, and borrowed to pay 
the fine. [30] Farmers generally took their tenants to court as a last resort, however, and 
preferred dealing with them in their own way. 
Henry Gold was one of the few farmers whose diaries have survived. Between 1898 and 
1910, they mention numerous loans to his tenants for which he usually expected labour in 
return. Only one entry mentions the period - Jacili received £3 for which he had to work for 
six months without pay, that is he had to repay it at a rate of 10s. wages per month. The 
diaries mention two instances of loans to be repaid by cash: in 1904 Umwaqaya received 
£2.10s.Od. and had to pay interest of 10s. per fortnight (48 per cent p.a.) while in 1909 
Hebegi had to pay £3 within two months for a £2 loan (300 per cent). [3 l] 
Indebtedness to Traders 
Although reserve inhabitants were not faced with the same conditions as those on the farms, 
many were becoming caught up in a similar situation of indebtedness. In need of money for 
food and taxes, they turned to their local traders for advances. 
Because of their agricultural techniques and monoculture, African producers were more 
affected by conditions such as drought than were white farmers. As has been mentioned, 
taxes were normally payable after the harvest when prices were low. To meet these 
demands, many Africans were selling crops they needed for their own consumption and were 
later buying maize at higher prices. This - and a growing demand for imported goods - was 
changing African attitudes. As the trader was now the supplier of their needs, it was easy to 
become dependent on him for food instead of, as in the past, relying on traditional methods 
of exchange and barter. Evidence of traders taking advantage of African misfortune is 
widespread and is reflected in an increase in the number of promissory notes they were 
drawing up. [32] 
The need to rebuild cattle herds ensnared the Africans even further into a system of debt. 
This need coincided with a concerted campaign by the Transvaal gold mines to recruit labour 
throughout southern Africa by means of labour agents, or touts. Initially, chiefs and izinduna 
were contracted to supply labour [33], but, as the mines developed and a greater supply of 
labour was needed, so the mining houses turned increasingly to traders. 
Traders offered an ideal source of supply, for in the rural areas they had direct access to the 
homesteads, the inhabitants of many of which were already becoming dependent on them. 
Both Horwitz and Beinart have shown that traders throughout southern Africa were able to 
offer cash advances to labourers, while many built up cattle herds in order to have beasts to 
offer as advances for labour. [34] Men in need of money or of cattle for lobola would 
contract with a trader, agreeing to serve on the mines for a specific period at a nominal wage 
in return for an advance of up to £20, or for one or two head of cattle which had to be repaid 
at at least double the value. As a result they received hardly any monthly pay and sank 
further into debt [35], while there was little risk involved to the trader for the homestead head 
was responsible for repayment. [36] The 1906 Native Affairs Commission was told that nine 
out of ten African labourers were working off advances. [37] 
Indebtedness to Lawyers 
In its report, the 1906 Commission also drew attention to the spreading indebtedness 
resulting from the increasing number of court cases involving Africans. 
The advent of responsible government in 1893 heralded the introduction of a wide array of 
laws making Africans liable to a wide range of fines. The result was a dramatic increase in 
the number of Africans appearing in court. [38] In 1906 Joseph Baynes pointed out that an 
average of 4,000 Africans were arrested every month for breaches of laws, regulations and 
municipal by-laws. 1391 A large proportion of those charged were convicted; between 1903 
and 1905, 129,772 were charged of whom 99,678, or 76.8 per cent, were convicted. [40] Of 
these, many contracted debts to pay the fines and escape imprisonment. [41] 
Court rules and regulations introduced during the 1890s made it more difficult for Africans to 
conduct their own cases. 1421 In addition, the use of contracts, promissory notes, bonds, 
mortgages and the ownership of immovable property had become widespread and had made 
the use of lawyers necessary. In Klip River County, in particular, where land purchases were 
by syndicates, which the law did not recognize as a purchaser, there were numerous problems 
concerning individual rights. The result was "endless and costly litigation". [43] 
Evidence given to the Native Suitors' Commission of 1902 also reveals the extent to which 
Africans were using lawyers to protect themselves from the exactions of both chiefs and 
farmers. Dhlozela's words sum up much of the evidence: "lawyers are the pillars that 
support the world, and from whom we get our salvation because they assist the person who is 
being skinned by the very chiefs ..."; and, "If we have no lawyer to assist us every white 
man on the farm will be his own lawyer". [44] The former comment is indicative of the 
breakdown occurring in hierarchical relations within the kinship system and explains why, 
despite the charges levied by lawyers, so many of the commoners who gave evidence in 1902 
welcomed their services. A large proportion of the work of country lawyers was for African 
clients [45], who, between 1901 and 1905, were represented in court in 25% of all cases. 1461 
Some of these were quite unnecessary: for example, a lawyer seldom charged less than £2 to 
£3 a case yet, in Upper Tugela, Boya retained G Jackson when he sued Alexander Brothers 
for 12s. for transport charges. [47] 
The payment of lawyers' fees was causing privation and hardship. Many debts were incurred 
to collect sufficient to pay the costs. These frequently led to further civil actions for 
recovery [48], which in turn often led to the defendants' property being seized to pay 
judgement and costs. [49] As confiscated stock was almost invariably given a low valuation, 
the high price of cattle after rinderpest would have involved people in heavy losses and 
contributed to the further spread of indebtedness in the colony. 
The Response of the Natal Administration 
In 1906, Africans in Natal and Zululand rose in rebellion. Despite acting ruthlessly against 
the rebels, the government could not but be aware that many Africans had been driven into 
rebellion by a growing sense of despair at the economic pressures placed on them. This 
realization led to the appointment in 1906 of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, with 
particular instructions to enquire into the charging of usurious rates to Afrficans by money- 
lenders, farmers and traders. No mention was made of indebtedness to lawyers. 
The Commission received many complaints about usury, revealing a "lamentable condition 
of affairs, showing the extent to which cupidity can go in trading upon the weakness and 
necessities of others". [50] In their report, the commissioners recommended, inter alia: 
a. That loans for interest should not be recoverable unless upon an attested 
written document; that ... no higher rate than fifteen per cent per annum be 
recovered upon any action, the courts having power at the same time to 
inquire into all the circumstances of the loan. 
b. That every promissory note ... should specify the amount borrowed, the rate of 
interest agreed ... and the date of repayment. 1511 
The new Moor ministry accepted these recommendations and in August 1907 instructed 
magistrates, until legislation was enacted, to carry them out when attesting promissory notes 
and to refuse to attest them if usurious charges were made. [52] 
Despite the urgency of addressing the problem of usury, a Native Interest Bill was introduced 
into the Legislative Assembly only in July 1908, and enacted later that year. Under the Act, 
the rate of interest and the date of repayment had to be stipulated in the promissory note, and 
the terms of a loan had to be explained to the borrower by a magistrate or justice of the 
peace. Fifteen per cent was laid down as the maximum interest which could be charged. 
Although this was higher than the colonial average of 6 per cent, few Africans were in a 
position to offer adequate security for the lower rate. 
The speeches in Hansard dealing with money-lenders bristle with righteous indignation. As 
so many money-lenders were Indians, it was easy to be indignant; the tone was very 
different when dealing with farmers who advanced money. The 1906 report described the 
giving of advances to be repaid by labour as the "most usual form of money-lending", 
recommended that it be included in the proposed interest bill, and suggested that the terms of 
repayment be the subject of contract and should not be enforceable under the Masters and 
Servants Act. [53] Although the Native Interest Bill included these recommendations, they 
were deleted by the Prime Minister, Frederick Moor, during the second reading. In 
attempting to justify this deference to farming opinion, Moor argued that to include the 
selling of labour for loans would bring about "a great hardship on the Native population, and 
also on many of the employers of labour". Ignoring the stranglehold the pass system placed 
on labour tenants, he averred that "unlike the interest the Native knows exactly what his 
labour is worth". [54] 
Indebtedness of farm tenants was, as has been seen, compounded by the abuse by farmers of 
the Identification Pass system. The commissioners recommended that the system be 
abolished and commented that it "is not an over-statement of the case to say that the position 
contains the germs of much unrest, and, by reason of its immensity and importance, warrants 
and demands the intervention of the state". [55] Their recommendations for an improvement 
of the conditions of labour tenants were ignored by the ministry, indicative of the continuing 
hold of the farming community over the administration. 
In their report, the commissioners urged that the abuses inherent in the advance system used 
by traders be ended. They recommended that store debts should not be recoverable against a 
homestead head unless it had been incurred personally by him, or by his authority. [56] They 
further recommended that Africans should receive the full wage for their labour, and that if 
advances were made to them they should not be at a higher rate than 15 per cent per annum. 
Contracts for advances should be signed in front of a magistrate. [57] The ministry ignored 
these recommendations as well. 
In a further attempt to eliminate the abuses inherent in touting, the Secretary for Native 
Affairs, Arthur Shepstone, and one of the four District Native Commissioners, Chere 
Emmett, visited Johannesburg in 1909 to investigate conditions on the mines. In their report 
they commented: 
We find that it has been customary for mining houses to place 
their contracts for the supply of native labour in the hands of 
contractors of native labour in Johannesburg. These "middle- 
men" ... and their agents have no more than a monetary interest 
in natives recruited by them ... [and] have no compunction in 
making all they can out of the natives whose value to them is 
calculated by the length of the period for which they are 
willing to give their labour ... [They are] private individuals 
who are engaged in recruiting solely for speculative reasons. 
In some cases we find that natives have phssed through the 
hands of almost a dozen labour agents, and native runners, all 
of whom share the recruiting premiums paid by companies by 
which they are eventually employed, which premiums are 
subsequently recovered from the natives. [58] 
The Shepstone-Emmett report proposed that, in order to minimize the abuse of advances, the 
Transvaal government should establish depots in suitable districts in Natal and Zululand 
through which they could obtain labourers with as little recourse as possible to touts. [59] 
They also recommended that, when labourers were recruited by touts, no advance exceeding 
£5 be permitted. [60] No action appears, however, to have been taken on these 
recommendations. 
Conclusion 
By the end of the colonial period, despite the acknowledgement by the Native Affairs 
Commission that the despair arising out of indebtedness had played a major part in the 
outbreak of the Bambatha Rebellion, little had been done to remedy the evil. While usurious 
rates had been limited to 15 per cent and more effective checks had been introduced to 
protect African borrowers from money-lenders, nothing had been done to alleviate the causes 
which led to indebtedness in the first place. As a result, as the need for loans remained as 
great as ever, many Africans found themselves in a position where they were forced into 
illicit borrowing and obviously the risk involved in this form of illegal transaction ensured 
very high interest rates. 
In addition, the most common cause of indebtedness, that arising from loans to secure labour, 
had deliberately been ignored by the Moor ministry. Attempts to limit advances paid by 
traders to Africans going to the gold mines were quietly ignored while the ministry made no 
secret of its determination to resist any attempt to interfere with farmers' relations with their 
tenants. 
By Union, African indebtedness accordingly remained widespread throughout Natal. On one 
level, it can be argued that it had become a mechanism which could be used to ensure the 
survival of those homesteads which were in the process of losing access to cattle and which 
were incapable of cultivating sufficient to feed themselves. The disruption of the pre- 
colonial support system meant that without loans many homesteads might have been unable 
to survive and the process of proletarianization which occurred later in the century might 
have been hastened. Loans, however, merely delayed the process while the indebtedness 
which resulted from them ensured that many of the poor of late-colonial Natal, struggling to 
preserve themselves from physical want, were, in the post-Union period, to fall into the 
category of the very poor. 
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